Text for proofreading:

There are relatively few remarks of Wittgenstein dealing directly with the concept of truth, but this do not mean that the problem of truth amount merely to a peripheral issue in the context of his philosophy: on the contrary, it is related to the question of the nature of propositions, which lie at the heart of both his earlier and later approaches.

 In the present text, I would like to essentially limited myself to discussing what paragraphs 134-137 of Philosophical Investigations have to say about truth. Nevertheless, it is almost impossible to interpret these parts of the text in a proper manner without invoking thoughts expressed in Wittgenstein’s earlier writings. This is because – as he himself points out in the Preface to the Investigations – the remarks contained there should be read in the context of those contain in the Tractatus.

For this reason, I begin with a short presentation of Wittgenstein’s approach to truth as contained in the Tractatus, before turning to a discussion of §§ 134-137 of the Investigations. My considerations regarding these paragraphs lead me to a number of conclusions. The first of these is that Wittgenstein formulates neither a theory, nor a definition of truth. The second is that he aims to show what relations hold between the concept of truth and the concept of a proposition. The third is that the relationship between these two concepts may consist, inter alia, in the fact that truth and falsity, in certain language games, are constitutive elements of what a proposition is, but it must be added that these concepts (truth, proposition) cannot be comprehended independently from each other. Finally, my fourth conclusion is that the concept of truth is expressed in various ways in our language, it being conveyed, inter alia, by such expressions as “… is true” and “this is how things are: …”, and that this shows that while asserting that something is true one can emphasize, on the one hand, that it is a proposition that says that things are a certain way, and on the other, just the fact that things are thus and so. I end my text with considerations on two further issues: the question of how Wittgenstein approaches the problem of truth-bearers, and that of whether he ought to be considered an adherent of the redundancy conception of truth.